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RECENT DECISIONS
Support and justification can be found for both views. It would seem
to be self-evident, however, that the law on such a basic point must be
dear and certain. The majority of jurisdictions, following Adams v. Lind-
sell, have chosen as the critical event in the formation of the contract, the
overt act of the offeree in mailing the acceptance. Although this rule is
subject to certain logical criticisms, the new rule too can be criticized in
that it will create confusion and instability by undercutting the Adams rule
when no basic policy consideration or great injustice has demanded it
DANI13L B. RoTH
PRACTICE - JURISDICTION - SPECIAL APPEARANCE
TO PLEAD TO THE MERITS
The plaintiff, a Delaware corporation, filed suit in Delaware for an
accounting against the defendant, a non-resident, for violation of his fiduci-
ary duty to the plaintiff, and against the defendant's wife, also a non-resident,
for conspiring with her husband in the alleged breach. Since the defendants
were residents of the State of Florida and so not amenable to personal service,
they were served by mail and ordered to appear in court in accordance with
the provisions of the Delaware attachment statute.1 Stock 'held by the de-
fendants in the plaintiff corporation was seized by a sequestrator. The de-
fendants sought leave of court to appear specially to defend their property
without submitting generally to the jurisdiction of the court. Leave was
denied.2
The court reasoned that the purpose of an attachment as set out in the
statute is to compel the defendant to make a general appearance. Conced-
ing that the defendants could make a special appearance to contest jurisdic-
tion, the court felt that such a special appearance could not be expanded to
allow the defendants to plead to the merits while limiting the court's juris-
diction to the value of the property attached.
There is a split of authority on the rule of law enunicated in the instant
case. The view expressed is opposed by the famous federal case of Salmon
Falls Manufacturing Company v. Midland Tire and Rubber Company.3
The rationale of the latter case is not founded so much on the interpretation
of the statute as on the intent of the defendant. In order to make a general
appearance it was held that the defendant must have the intent to make
such an appearance. The court concluded that the defendant could make a
'DEL. CODE ANN. title 10, § 366: "The court may compel the appearance of the
defendant by the seizure of all or any part of his property which property may be
sold under order of the court to pay the demand of the plaintiff, if the defendant
does not appear, or otherwise defaults...."
2 Leftcourt Realty Corp. v. Sands, 113 A.2d 428 (Del. 1955).
'Salmon Falls Mfg. Co. v. Midland Tire and Rubber Co., 285 Fed. 214 (1922).
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special appearance to plead to the merits of the attachment while limiting
the court's jurisdiction to the value of the attached property. All that he is
required to do is to declare at the proper time that he is only appearing
specially.4
The court in the instant case, on the other hand, reasoned that there are
but two types of appearances: (1) a special appearance to contest the
jurisdiction of the court, and (2) a general appearance. Some courts ex-
pressing this view have argued that the purpose of a special appearance is
to protect the defendant from being required to defend an action over
which the court has no jurisdiction.5 Others have asserted that the very
word "appearance" means a voluntary submission to the court's jurisdiction
in whatever form it is manifested, and one who participates in the proceed-
ings for any other purpose than that of assailing the jurisdiction of the court,
nothwithstanding that he states his appearance is only special, is deemed
to have made a general appearance.
6
Aside from the approach of the Salmon Falls court there is another view
which allows the defendant to appear specially and plead to the merits. The
advocates of this position point out that the manifest purpose of an attach-
ment statute is not to compel the non-resident defendent, if he appears at all,
to appear generally.7 Their interpretation of the statute does not disclose
the intent to impose upon a non-resident the burden of making a general
appearance in order to protect his property rights. There are a number
of courts which adopt his view by stating that the primary purpose of an
attachment is merely to enable the plaintiff to acquire a lien upon the prop-
erty which will be levied upon after judgment.8 Where this view is ac-
cepted there would seem to be no reason to prohibit the defendant from
protecting his property without subjecting himself to the general jurisdic-
tion of the court.
As has been explained above, the instant case took a different view, the
court stating that the main purpose of an attachment is to compel the gen-
eral appearance of the defendant if he desires to protect his property.9 The
court felt that the wording of the statute required such an interpretation.
" Bissell v. Brigg, 9 Mass. 462, 6 Am. Dec. 88 (1813); RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS
§ 40 (1942); Miller Bros. Co. v. State, 201 Md. 535, 95 A.2d 286 (1953).
'Kaiser-Frazer Corp. v. Eaton, 46 Del. 509, 85 A.2d 752 (1952); Blaustein v.
Standard Oil Co., 43 Del. 516, 51 A.2d 568 (1947); Sanford Mfg. Co. v. West-
ern Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 225 Iowa 1018, 282 N.W. 771 (1938).
'Wisniewski v. Wysocki, 36 N.Y.S.2d 712 (1942); Braman v. Braman, 236 App.
Div. 164, 158 N.Y. Supp. 181 (1932); Citizens Trust Co. of Utica v. R. Prescott
and Sons, 221 App. Div. 426, 223 N.Y. Supp. 191 (1927).
'Cheshire Nat'l Bank v. Jaynes, 224 Mass. 14, 112 N.E. 500 (1916).
8 Mclnnes v. McKay, 127 Me. 110, 141, Al. 699 (1928); Poulan v. Gallagher, 147
So. 723 (La. App. 1933); Pierce v. Mallard 150 S.E. 342 (1929); Farmers and
Merchants' Nat'l Bank v. Sprout, 104 Kan. 348, 79 Pac. 301 (1919).
'Omnium De Participations Industries De Luxe (SA) v. Spoturno, 39 Del. 100, 196
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To fortify this conclusion some courts have reasoned that litigation on
the merits is not limited to the right to hold a lien on the property proceeded
against but also goes to the merits underlying the personal claim. 10 Ex-
pressed in the opinion is the idea that if defendant is willing to litigate his
clain in part in order to protect his property, he should be required to let
his defense to the merits determine the entire claim.
The court refused to accept the cases which expanded the definition of
a special appearance and tried to distinguish the opposing cases by stating
that the attachment statutes involved in those cases are different from the
statute m the instant case. But the statutes are not so basically different that
the Delaware court could not by interpretation reach an opposite result."
Whether the court has found a true distinction is a matter of opinion,
but it seems that the end result is equitable and the rule of the case a just
rule. No matter what the intent of the statute or what definition is given
to a special appearance, if the defendant wants to defend his property he
ought logically to be made to defend himself against the personal claim as
well.
JOHN M. CRONQUIST
At. 194 (1937); Nazareth Cement Co. v. Union Idemnity Co., 116 Pa. Super.
520, 177 Ad. 64 (1935).
"Grant v. Kellogg, 3 F.R.D. 229 (1943); MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTicE, § 12.12
(2d. Ed. 1948).
"MAss. REv. LAWs. c. 170 (1902)
"§ 1 or unless an effectual attachment of his property within this common-
wealth has been made upon the original writ, and in case of such attachment with-
out such service, the judgment shall be valid to secure the application of the property
so attached to the satisfaction of the judgment, and not otherwise. "
"§ 6 Upon proof that service has been made as ordered, such defendant shall
be held to answer to the action and no further service shall be necessary. "
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